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CASE NO. 10539

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM B. GRAMES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
TESSA ANN GRAMES,
Defendant and Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the question :
1. Can a man be held liable for the support of a child,

not his O"Wn, conceived prior to his marriage to the natural mother, but born to the natural mother after she had
married said man?

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case here on appeal is the result of a judgment
entered in a default divorce wherein the court found
that the plaintiff was not the natural father of a child
horn to the natural mother while married to the plaintiff, but has required the plaintiff to pay the sum of
$30.00) Dollars per month rhild support regardless.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAf,
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court'·, ·
~ JUI"·
1
ment to the extent that the plaintiff be relieved 'f· '
.
rorn
further payment of child support payrnenh; pur~u ,
2
to the order of the District Court and that the Divoie
Decree be made absolute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff on the 20th day of Decembe1·, i:11 :,
met the defendant Tessa Ann Grames, who at that fo,
was pregnant by another man and had been pregnam
since the month of August, 1964, and that the defendan·
began dating the plaintiff and on the 11th day of :\Iardi.
1965, the defendant entered into marriage with u1,
plaintiff within the State of California knowing fo!:
well that she was pregnant, but that the same wasnot!i1,
During the month of May, 1965 the said child was h11n1.
That shortly thereafter the plaintiff wa:; adrntl
by his wife, the defendant, that she no longer l0Yrd 1:i1
and married him only for the purposes of givin~ lw
illegitimate child a name.

1

'rhe plaintiff then filed an action for Annullnw11
or in the alternative Divorce against the defen<lai1
Complaint was served upon upon the defendant on ti:'
15th day of September, 1965 within the Statr of l\11
fornia.
1

Tlw following datPs arP siµ:nifieant in thi~

('3"

October, l ~J64 Defendant heco111rs pregnant hy a 1w11
other than thP plaintiff.
December 20, 1964 Plaintiff rnPets the deft>ndant f,
the first time.

i [

,,

are j1 11, 1 ;-i"6~ Defendant and plaintiff marry within
the State of California.
·J

,f , 1965 Said child is delivered to the defendant.
.\ a}'
June, 1965 Defendant advise~ pla.~ntiff that she no
longPr loves him and married him only to acquire
ii

name for her child.

September 10, 1965 Plaintiff files for divorce.
September 15, 1965 Defendant served with process.
December 22, 1965 Court p:rants final Decree of Divorce.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THIRD PARTY CANNOT LEGITIMATIZE AN
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD EXCEPT BY ADOPTION
The court understandably in arriving at its decision was concerned about bastardizing the child in
question, which perhaps is not relevant to the point
before this court. However, the plaintiff chooses to
comment on this point at this time because it was of
roncern to the trial court.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "bastard" as follows:
''A child born of an unlawful intercourse and
before the lawful marriage of its parents" (Pettus
vs. Dawson, 82 Texas 18, 17 S. W. 714)
It further defines "bastard" as follows:
''A child born after marriage, but of circum-

stances which renders it impossible that the
husband of the mother can be the father." (State
3

vs. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.

·w. 2d 54G)

The applicable State Statutes herein are as follow~·

'-•

78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 which read"'l1he father of an illegitimate child, hy puhlir·i·
acknowledging it as his own, receiYin"b 1't a.:-.; !-1\1"1
,.
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, inr,
his family, and otherwise treating it a~
were a legitimate child, thereby adopb it ~·
such, and such child is thereby deemed for al
purposes legitimate from the time of its h1r;I,
77-60-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 stab 1
follows:
''If the mother of any such child and the father
shall at any time after its birth intermarry, !I·
child shall in all respects be deemed to be legit
mate, and the bond for its support shall thereup1111
become void."

And 78-30-1 through 15 as amended, Utah Coe•
Annotated, 1953 relevant to the adoption la~,
of the State of Utah.

It is plaintiff's contention that a child conceive1i
or born outside the vows of marriage is an illegitimai
child and there are only three ways under Ftah La
by which the child can be made legitimate.
1

11

1. Acknowledgment by natural father.
2. Maniage between the natural father and natur::
mother.
3. Adoption.

11 he plaintiff calls the court's attention to the fari
4

that the Code states "the father" of such child and ~kes
no pro\1T·sion for a third party to adopt the child by

or acknowledgment.
ma rrl·ao-e
I"> •
The refore, regettably the child in question is an
·lJerritimate child and C'an be legitimized only in the man:iertiontlined aboYe, and the plaintiff cannot legitimatize
the child hy marriage or acknowledgment, but may legitimatize the child by formal adoption, which was his plan
'.I~ evidenced by his testimony. (Certified Record, Page
3. Lines 14-17)
The facts will further show that the defendant,
m this action by her acts refused to allow plaintiff
this opportunity. (Certified Record, Page 3, Lines
21-24)

POINT II.
PUBLIC POLICY

It would appear that the District Court ruling
would strike at the heart of good public policy. Society
should encourage young unmarried girls with child to
marry in hopes that as a result of such marriage the
husband will adopt the illegitimate child, thus causing
it to lose the stigma of "bastard" and give it a name
and good home.
However, plaintiff submits that most men would
shy away from such an involvement if they were aware
that by marrying a woman with child or even a woman
who had given birth to prior illegitimate children, they
would be required to thereafter and forever support
those children conceived by the union of another.
5

Thus, it would seem that good public polir;; .
•
' \\0111.1
dictate that a man, gentleman
enoug-h
" to ""tep f' orwa,,·.·
and marry a woman under those circumstance~ .1 ·,
•
'' ~ 1UU11:
be encouraged to d_o so without the fear that he i~ µui11:
to be forever reqmred to support her illegitirnatp. (Jill,
"·r
ren bv a union other than his.
1

POINT III.
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT~
RULING THAT A MAN MAY BF~ HELf1 T<i ~r!
PORT AN ILLEGITIMA11 E CHILD :NOT HI:-; 1:w
Plaintiff acknowledges this court's previous ruling t] 1;i
a child born during a marriage creates a in·r~umptu:.
that the husband is the father. However, ~urh pre
surnption is subject to rebuttal and may be overcorn·
by testimony. The record will show in this instance tha
under no circumstances could the child in question han
been fathered by the plaintiff and indeed t11e trial eow·
in its Findings of Fact, paragraph 3, found that no chilii
ren were horn of issue to the plaintiff and defenda~I
herein.
Plaintiff concedes that there is a split in the lii1"
of decisions as to whether or not the father can he h,I,]
The lead case apparently holding that a man can ht
held under such circumstances is State v. Shoernak·
( 1883) 62 Iowa 343, 17 NW 589. Again in Miller v. Jnderson (1885) 43 Ohio St. 473, 3 NE 605, the previou'
case was ~O"f'nerally sustained ' and again Gustin v. Gmtrn
(1958) 108 Ohio App. 171, 9 Ohio Ops. 2d 204. 161 XE
2d 68, held similar to the previous two cases cited. Hoii
ever, the courts, at arriving at their conclusions ap
parently arrived at it the basis that the husband har:

1

6

1. d to stand in Loco Parentis.
elec,e

' ie IJlaintiff in this case as previously indicated in
,: .f·.' :ntenclc•(l at a future date to adopt the child
l.11~

't'I
l J11'

j

. n··It o·ivf'• it his name.
<l
Cl

~

The line of eases holding that a man cannot be reto .;upport a child not to be his own, appears to
In Kucera v. Kucera
1 e in die u1ajori ty and most recent.
: 1u1;~ .'; L)) 117 K\Y2d 810, the court states as follows:

·lmiecl

·'\Vhere both the husband the the wife concede
that a child born after marriage of the parties is
not the child of the husband because of nonacee:-:s h~· the husband at the time of conception,
which ocrnrred before the marriage of the parties,
and \\here the husband married the wife with
full knowledge of her pregnancy by another man
and did so for the express purposes of giving
the unborn child a name, the trial court cannot
require the husband to support the child when the
parties thereafter separate or are divorced, on
the theory that the husband's marriage to the
wife, with full kno".·ledge of her pregnancy by
another, was eonsent on his part to stand in loco
parentis as to the child who thereafter was born."
Also it was similarly held in Commonwealth v.
Sprouse (1957) l.) Pu. D. & C2d 701 that a man was not
rstopped from den~ving that he was the father of illegitimate children conceived hy his wife and born to his wife
i 1rior to tliPir marriage.
Similarly, it has been held in People ex rel. Hood
'·'· Gleason (1918) 211 Ill. App. 390 that in a bastardv
1;roceeding wlwre a man married a woman five day.s

before the birth of her child, the court said b,·• Way ·
dictum that the law does not impose upon a hti b.. '·
s a11i.
any duty to support or to contribute to the surivort r.'
his wife's bastard child, not withstanding the fact tha:
the child was born five days after his marriage to 1111
relatrix.
POINT IV.
DIVORCE TERMINATES FATHER IN LOC'O
PARENTIS FROM FURTHER SUPPORT
Thus in Clevenger v. Clevenger (1961) 189 l'a'
App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 90 ALR2d, 569 it wa~ heir·
that a man may terminate by divorce his status of Jol'.r
parentis to an illegitimate child without further obliga
tions of child support or contribution.
In D. v. D. (1959) 56 NJ Super 357, 153 A2d 332, the
court said that although a husband might have stood iJJ
loco parentis to an illegitimate child for a certain time.
the continuance of such relationship was a matter lying
entirely within his will and since it was ended by h~
will, the husband was not bound to support the illegitimate child of his wife.
Taylor v. Taylor (1961) 58 Wash. 2d 510, 364 P~d
444, the court said while a person standing in loru
parentis ·was bound to support and educate the child.
the relationship thus founded was a temporary one aTii
depended upon the intentions of the party assuming th1
obligations of a parent, so that the decisive issue in the
case at bar was whether such bonds oon be dissolved
and that the status of one in loco parentis is voluntari
and temporarv and may be abrogated at will by either
the party in ioco parentis or the child and that in re·
8

burdens attendant upon such status these
of tl i e
.
·
be
abandoned
at
anv
time.
may
·
~,ved

ln Farris v. Farris (19Gl) 59 Wash. 2d 837, 365
P2d 1+ it held that in a divorce action the husband canr}(Jt he ordPrec1 to support his wife's children unless he
:E-:

tile fa tltPl'.

WP thus conclude that even if the court found the
nlaintiff did stand in loco parentis, it is a relationship
;hat maY be terminated at \\:ill or particularly by divorce
and tlm~, the plaintiff hPrein cannot be required to pay
11 mnanent child support for a child conceived by an11tller
POINT V.

RELA'l1ED STATUTES
It would appear that the spirit of recent rulings
of thi8 court together with recent inactments of the Utah
Legislature, that both the court and the legislature recognize that there are situations that exist where a husband
should not be required to support a child not his own even
thoug-h married to the natural mother.

Plaintiff calls the court"s attention to Utah's new
Paternity Act, 78-45a-1, Ftah Code Annotated, 1953
which states as follows:
''The father of a child which is or may be born
out of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the
father of a child born in wedlock, whether or not
the child is horn alive, for the reasonable expense
of the mother's pregnancy and confinement and
for the education, neeessary support and funeral
PXpenses of the child. A child born otd of wed9

lock includes a child born to a married WO'111an ,.,,
a man other than her husband."
We would emphasize the last line of the above qurJ,.
where it states, "A child born out of wedlock include~
child born to a married woman by a man other than 1 ~,
husband."
Thus the Legislature through its Paternitv ,\,.
has recognized that a marrried woman may pursue 11.•
natural father for support even though she is mani 1 ,
to another.
Further this court in State v. Hunt 13 Ut. 2d 32. 3of
P2d 261 held that a woman may avail herself of tlie
Bastardy Statute in seeking support for an illegitirnat~
child even though the child was conceived during we0.
lock to another.
POINT VI.
TRIAL COURT EXPRESSES DOUBT
The Trial Court itself indicated that it felt that
this was a matter upon which the Supreme Court
this state should pass upon. Thus plaintiff submi!~
the court iself is in doubt and is requesting a guide fa
further artion. (Certified Report, Last Page, Line f,
11

1

& 7)

CONCLUSION
rrhe rrrial Court's Order requiring the plaintiff to
pay permanent child support should be declared voio
and in view of the fact that three months will have el

10

pired by the time that this matter has been ruled upon
,ince the Decree of Divorce was entered, the Decree of
Divorce should be made absolute.

Respectfully submitted,
Darrell George Renstrom

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
259 - 24th Street
Ogden, Utah
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